PHILIP SELZNICK
Good morn i n g, eve ry b o dy. I must say it gladdens my heart, if I can use such a timew o rn phra s e, to be part of these proceedings. I have read quite a few of the Bahá'í documents, and I found my s e l f ve ry much in s y m p at hy with a gr e at deal that has been said. I cannot claim to be "spiri t u a l ly learn e d , " but perhaps I can suggest that in a small way I have been "spiritually musical"-that's not quite the same thing.
I have tried, through most of my work in sociology, to connect up the p ractical side of life-the way orga n i z ations are run, the way our lega l systems are constructed, the way our theories of human nature are u n d e rs t o o d -I ' ve tried to connect all these things up with the animating principles, the va l u e s, the moral commitments that people can and should make. And it is by ke eping in the forefront these moral commitments that we can better understand all of these aspects of l i f e. It seems to me-not eve ryone would agree with this, of c o u rs e -t h at this has made me a better sociologist, better Perhaps I could lighten this discourse a bit by telling a little story, not a long story. It's about a young man who was twenty-two ye a rs old in 1941-an intense, somew h at skinny young man. He was alw ays was a lw ays asking people to "Be serious!" And of c o u rse his young acquaintances and comrades were not going to be all that serious, but he would w ag his tongue and his finger a bit at them and sometimes they would listen to him. Now this young man, at the age of t we n t y -t w o, was go i n g through a rather intense moral ex p e r i e n c e. He had been associated fo r s eve ral ye a rs with a young socialist orga n i z ation, and he had left and was more or less on his own in 1941 and was trying to solve the riddle o f socialism: the difficulties that socialist ideals represent in a world that was so full of greed and power and self-aggrandizement. He turn e d from the ort h o d oxies of Marxism, and even of l i b e ral thought, to much t h at he found useful in modern theology.
The secret is out: that young man was named Philip. I was ve ry yo u n g, but I thought that I ought to take ideas ve ry serio u s ly. I loved ideas; perhaps I was a bit intox i c ated by them. But in t rying to understand, in trying to deal with this, the dilemmas of socialist idealism, I turned to some theological writings, especially the work of the gr e at Christian theologian of the twentieth century, Reinhold Niebu h r, also Paul Tillich, and a few others, all of w h o m were trying to say something important about the dilemmas of h u m a n ex p e r i e n c e.
I 'll just mention a couple of the things that I learned from this theol ogical unders t a n d i n g. One was-and this seemed to be really releva n tit was ve ry easy for human beings to do evil in the name of the good, to do things that were wrong and hurtful and oppressive, while also pleading that they belonged to a noble world and they were pursuing a nobl e c a u s e. These writings pointed up the danger of doing evil in the name of the good, and they associated it with the sin of i d o l at ry, "idolat ry " b e i n g, r o u g h ly speaking, the association of absolute good with a movement, a p a rt y, oneself-as a young person or as a parent or what have yo u -t h e w o rship of something that is contingent and limited as if it we r e ab s o l u t e.
One of the things we learned was that this failure to understand limit at i o n s, this failure to understand the likelihood of doing evil, of m a k i n g t e rr i ble mistake s, moral mistake s, in the course of t rying to do something good-all that was ordinary theological unders t a n d i n g, unders t a n d i n g that had been going on for a long time. And I took it to my heart. A n o t h e r t h e o l ogical principle-and I'll mention only this one-has to do with the r e l ationship between power and perfection.
It came to me gra d u a l ly, not as in a blinding light, but only over time, t h at one had to understand the ways of God to man, and that way is m a i n ly this: to see that only in God can there be a union of p ower and perfection. Only in God, or at least the idea of God, is there a sense that there are no limits, that there is ab s o l u t e ly disinterested love, that there is perfection in motivation, and that therefore unlimited power can be a s s u m e d .
The corollary of t h at is that no h u m a n being and no h u m a n i n s t i t u t i o n can represent the union of p ower and perfection. It is not given to us as human beings to be all-powerful or to presume that we are all-perfect. Rat h e r, we recognize that all human institutions must be limited in some w ay, and ab ove all limited by our understanding of w h at moral ideals call fo r.
And so when we speak of d e m o c ratic majorities, or when we say that " we should fo l l ow the will of the people , " it is for us to ask, How should t h at will be gove rned? Is not the will of the people also something that is subordinate to some higher law, some higher principle which will criticize that will and which will limit that will? So, too, in my thinking and writings on the sociology of l aw, I have taken it for granted that law is not its own justification, that no act of a leg i s l at u r e, no judicial opinion, can ever really have the last word; that there is alw ays something else to be said, some principle to be invo ked, some way of thinking that will point us to some new road, some new path, some new way of t h i n k i n g about justice. The work of justice is never done and that means also that the power of people who say they speak in the name of justice is neve r an unlimited power; it is alw ays limited by some appeal to the higher principles of j u s t i c e.
These are some of the things that this young man learned from his reading of t h e o l ogy, from his effo rt to think seriously about the limits of social idealism, the limits of any effo rt to try to change the world. Now, o f c o u rs e, this does not mean that a twe n t y -t w o -year-old would fail to t a ke seriously all of his ideas. He took those ideas ve ry seriously indeed. He was skinny but he thought he had broad shoulders, and he thought he could carry the world on those shoulders. In time, I'm happy to say, he mellowed. In time, he came to see his own limitat i o n s. In time, he came to see that he ought to stop and think before he speaks. He doesn't a lw ays do that even now, but he tries it sometimes.
Wh at I'm trying to say with this little story is that my effo rts to be s p i r i t u a l ly musical, to take seriously the thinking that has gone on ab o u t the vindication of, as Alexander Pope said, the ways of God to man, of the implications all that has for the way we think about morality and society-this is not something that is new to me, not something that has not become part of my life. Now it may seem ve ry strange indeed to hear a Berkeley sociologist-a B e rke l ey s o c i o l og i s t ! -s ay things like this, and yet, thank God we have had academic freedom, we have been able to pursue the truth as God gives us to see the tru t h .
In recent ye a rs I have been trying to understand better the phenomenon we call c o m m u n i t y-this is a word that is familiar to all of yo u -a n d I ' ve tried to understand this in a way that takes account of both the changes in social reality, the ways social life is organized, and the ideals t h at we associate with community.
I have resisted the temptation to answer the question, Is t h i s a community? Is t h at a community? but rather to say that all groups are communities i n s o far as they do certain things: insofar as they are, they take account of, and try to deal with a broad range of interests and ideals; insofar as they take account of and respond to people as whole persons-as living, responding individuals who have their own needs and their own problems; insofar as we can see ideals of caring and mutual c o n c e rn manifested in the experience of the g r o u p. So the idea of c o mm u n i t y, as we say in social science, is va r i abl e. It's not all or none. And t h at has ve ry important implications because it suggests that the idea of community and the values that we associate with community can be found in many different settings. We can look for community in a conference of this kind; we can look for community in a family; we can look for community in a Boy Scout troop; we can look for community in the classroom; we can look for community in a law school or unive rs i t y, or w h at have you; we can look for community in a nation, and we may find it only to some extent.
Our problem is how to deepen and enrich the experience of c o m m un i t y. Therefore the idea of c o m m u n i t y, like the idea of l ove, can be applied in many different settings. And we say that human beings ought to obey the law of l ove not because they can love eve rything in the same w ay but because the ideals we associat e, we e x p e r i e n c e, with lov i n g -o f c o n c e rn, of c a r i n g, of i n t e r d ependence-these ideals can be found and made manifest in many different ways and in many different aspects of l i f e.
I would venture to say that if there is a public philosophy associat e d with the intellectual discipline we call sociology, that public philosophy is this one: it is the public philosophy of enriching and enhancing comm u n i t y, of t rying to discover ways of reconciling differences. It is a public philosophy that says you have to do the best you can to see that people live together in harmony and mutual concern and respect. And so I h ave come up with something I call the principle of c o m m u n i t y, which I h ave fo rm u l ated as the union of solidarity and re s p e c t.
It is not solidarity alone that makes for community because we can h ave solidarity enforced by commands that really have contempt for the people who are commanded. On the other hand, we can have a solidarity which takes seriously the individuality and dive rsity and uniqueness o f all of the components of the community, whether they are part i c u l a r groups or families or whether they are individuals. It is this principle of community that seems to be what we have to try to pursue and to see h ow far we can pursue it in the various contexts of our live s. In thinking about community, I've tried also to understand some dilemmas of c o m m u n i t y, dilemmas and ambiguities we sometimes turn aw ay from, but which we must recognize fo rt h r i g h t ly and try to deal with.
These thoughts have led me to consider the connection between two ideas I'd just like to spend a few minutes on today. One is the idea of c iv i l i t y, and the other is p i e t y. These are not unfamiliar ideas: we all use them from time to time. But it's important to see how they are sep a rat e and how they are connected. Civility can have a ve ry narr ow meaning: it can mean simply that someone else is speaking and we ought to be quiet and listen. And it might mean just being quiet and n o t l i s t e n i n g -j u s t taking turn s. You have your turn and I have my turn and that doesn't mean we listen to each other.
T h at kind of civility is an aspect of p u blic life which asks us to take account of our dive rs i t y -o f potential conflict-which asks us, ab ove all, to honor a principle of respect, so that we say we respect other people when we don't ask them too many embarrassing questions; we respect other people when we are reticent and quiet and withhold criticisms and we don't say eve rything that comes into our heads. We say, well, the situ ation requires that we be polite and show good manners: that's being civil. Or it may be, being civil is an aspect of our lives as public citizens, so that being civil means that we take seriously the principles of o u r community and relate to them. But you can be civil and you can honor civility and be respectful in a somew h at cool way, and you might say that civility is a principle that is rather more cool than hot. It's not so much an expression of passion; it's more an expression of r e s t raint: don't talk too much, don't talk out of t u rn; line up; be good for goodness' sake s. All these things are part of c i v i l i t y.
But think again more seriously about civility. Suppose we go from trying to take turns to really understanding one another. The more we e m b race the principle of shared unders t a n d i n g, the more we try to see other people as people to whom we must communicate in some deep w ay -at the ex t r e m e, of c o u rs e, is the experience of l oving someone e l s e, of u n d e rstanding that other person in a deep way, of responding to t h at other person's needs and concerns and feelings, of c a r i n g ab o u t those feelings and not just "respecting" them. Once you move in that direction and you move from listening to re a l ly l i s t e n i n g, then we see t h at civility asks much more of u s, and indeed may be also a deeper fo u nd ation of c o m m u n i t y. E ven civility in the sense in which I talked about it a moment ago, the n a rr ow sense of taking turns and watching your tongue and not embarrassing people, and so on-even that can help us fo rm communities because it can say we aren't going to say things or do things that will cast people out or that will make them uncomfo rt able and unhappy in our presence and therefore they will say, "I don't belong here; I'm go i n g to go somewhere else. " N o, the more we show respect for people, the more like ly it is that they will stand with us and feel that they belong, and if not belong, at least they are tolerated, and if they are tolerat e d they can be members. And so we say that all m e m b e rs o f the American c o m m u n i t y, all p e rs o n s, are entitled to the equal protection of the law; all p e rs o n s are entitled to due process of l aw; all p e rs o n s are entitled to the respect and good will of their fellow citizens. It's still just civility.
Many of you, I suppose, have thought something about the ideas of l i b e ralism. If you look at much that goes by the name of l i b e ral theory, l i b e ral thought, today, the focus really is on civility. The focus is on creating a world which can go forward and be sustained despite the fact t h at we have differences and we have different opinions. We have different ways of thinking and yet we belong together and should be tog e t her as citizens, therefo r e, as it we r e, we bra c ket our own special view s. We s ay those are not the views that will move us today, but rather we will o r ganize society in a liberal fashion so as to take account of these differences and allow us to live together despite our differences. This is the l i b e ral ethos.
L i b e ralism has not done so well with the other side of the coin, the other principle I want to mention, and that is the principle of p i e t y. Piety is a word that again can have a ve ry narr ow meaning, so that, for ex a mp l e, we simply may say the best example of p i e t y, many people would say, is filial piety, that is, being caring about, respectful of, and indeed obeying your parents; filial piety is the reverence and the respect that is accorded by children to their parents. George Santayana, the philosop h e r, put it this way once: he said piety in its nobler sense is the rev e re n t at t a chment a person has to the sources of his being. This means that piety has to do with loya l t y, with attachment, with commitment in the sense of t h e union of s e l f and other, of the union of s e l f and g r o u p, of the union of s e l f and God, if you like.
Piety is a principle that encourages the commitment of people one to another in a spirit of l i ke m i n d e d n e s s, in a spirit that sociologists used to call a consciousness of kind, of belonging to one another. It begins of c o u rse with kinship, with biology, but is extended to larger communities and also to the groups of which we are a part.
But you can have piety with respect to many different kinds of gr o u p s in one fo rm or another. You can have piety as a member of the faculty of the Unive rsity of C a l i fo rnia. You can have piety in which you take serio u s ly the fact of your membership and that we are, in some sense, in all this together and we share a common history, and we share in some sense a common fat e. And this sense of sharing a common commitment and history and fate is at the root of piety because it's this sharing of h i s t o ry and of f at e, and so on, that makes us feel that we know who we a r e. And knowing who we are helps us to appreciate the reach as well as the limits of our at t a c h m e n t s. You know that some attachments are ve ry i m p o rtant to us; we give our lives for those at t a c h m e n t s. Other at t a c hm e n t s, of c o u rs e, are less important, and yet they make a gr e at deal of difference to us; they define for us our authentic selve s.
Authenticity and piety and sharing of h i s t o ry-these are not aspects o f life that appeal ve ry much to the liberal mind because these are aspects of life that emphasize what we have in common, what we share, h ow we belong tog e t h e r, and the more we create in our communities a sense of t h at mutual belonging, the more we will want to embrace ideals o f p i e t y.
I want to say that piety and civility are not really so opposed as one might think. I said before that if you make a transition from taking turn s and listening and then clapping-going through these ex t e rnals-to a s i t u ation in which you listen seriously and intently and create an at m o sphere and an experience in which eve ryone shares in what ever it might be: a spiritual, or intellectual, or for that matter a musical, ex p e r i e n c e -i f you move in that direction, yo u 're like ly to create communities, people who think together and belong tog e t h e r. C o n s i d e r, for ex a m p l e, how we might think about an ecumenical meeting of people of different religions. I don't mean just different churches, but people of different religions, people who begin with some sharing of an appreciation of spirituality-they may be spiritually learned or only s p i r i t u a l ly musical but what they are is alert to the spiritual dimension o f our live s. These people, if they get together and talk about their u n d e rstandings of faith and God and moral truth, if they exc h a n g e v i ews about these things and do so with open hearts and open minds, t h e y 're like ly to create communities of shared unders t a n d i n g, and so there will be some element of piety that develops out of the e x p e r i e n c e o f c i v i l i t y. Wh at may begin as narr ow or constricted civility becomes a richer and deeper piety. And it's the connection between those that seems to be so important.
But there is another and perhaps darker and more chilling way of thinking about this connection. As you can see from the way I've talke d about this, I would genera l ly say that piety is a good thing, just as love is a good thing. But it's not an ab s o l u t e good thing. There are dangersm o ral dangers. It is a good, but we can do evil in the name that go o d . And we can do evil in the name of piety-when piety takes the fo rm of exc l u s i ve n e s s, when piety takes the fo rm of a claim to privileged tru t h ; when piety takes fo rm of a claim to privileged salvation, when piety t a kes the fo rm of an attack on others as damned and outside the pale and destined for hell. When piety takes this exc l u s i ve fo rm, when it becomes w rapped up with justifications for hatred and bigo t ry and violence, then piety becomes something less than a good thing. Piety becomes something that threatens humanity and makes us all fearful and concern e d . And so I think that piety that is divorced from civility is like ly to lead us d own a ve ry wrong path indeed.
And I'm happy to learn, as I have learned about the Bahá'í Faith, that the emphasis there is precisely on resisting these potential evils of p i e t y. I don't think it can ever be completely fo rsw o rn because it is part of t h e dynamics of group life that we think of o u rs e l ves as somehow better than others and we find it difficult to embrace the virtues of h u m i l i t y and self-transcendence that seem to be so required by a better understanding of p i e t y.
Let's go back for a moment to George Santayana's definition: the reverent attachment to the sources of one's being. Now, it's interesting that this reverent attachment generalizes the idea of piety-and of c o u rse we should not be surprised that a philosopher would want to genera l i z e : sometimes they do it well and sometimes not so well. But as Santaya n a was say i n g, the reverent attachment to the sources of one's being: that could mean, of c o u rs e, attachment to principles and not just to a part i cular group or institution. It might lead us to ask, Who are we? Wh at are the principles we live by? Wh at are our articles of faith?
All that would be consistent with the idea of piety as reverent at t a c hment to the sources of one's being because it still leaves open the question of w h at a re the sources of one's being? Is it the way we were brought up? Is it what our parents were like? Is it the books we have read? Is it the lectures we have given, the endless classes we have met? Are they w h at define ours e l ves as authentic human beings in the world? Is pat r i otism an example of this reverent attachment to the sources of o n e ' s being? Well, it might be, if by "pat r i o t i s m " we mean not necessarily "my c o u n t ry right or wrong" but "these are the principles my country is and should be committed to, and these principles provide us with criteria fo r assessment and criticism of w h at our country has done. " I mentioned earlier that (I won't say how many ye a rs ago, but that yo u can figure that out for yo u rself), when I was twenty-two I took seriously some of the ideas that were being presented in at least some kinds of Christian theology. Now, when I was writing a book called The Mora l C o m m o n we a l t h-it came out about ten ye a rs ago-a funny thing happened to me. It begins brave ly with a chapter on nat u ralism and ethics, with a strong defense of the views of my intellectual fat h e r, or may b e gra n d f at h e r, but perhaps father is best-John Dewe y, who alw ays took the view that our moral understandings are based upon our unders t a n ding of w h at people are like, of w h at institutions are like, what fra i l t i e s they have, what vulnerabilities they have, what aspirations they might p r o p e r ly have, on our understanding of w h at we must guard against in human affairs, and also our understanding of w h at we can aspire to in human affairs. For most of my life I've alw ays thought of my s e l f as a d evoted fo l l ower of John Dewey's humanist prag m atism. I began that book with a, I wouldn't say ringing, but an affirm at i ve ex p l i c ation of those ideas, and as I was coming to the end of the project-a long project indeed; too long for the patience of most people-I had a different vision, or should I say a corollary vision. It was this: if we want to think about a moral commonwealth, about the moral community, we have to u n d e rstand the difference between k n ow i n g something and a c c epting and a c t i n g on something.
We might well agree that the nat u ralist view, the view that rejects r e a l ly all the supern at u ral claims and tries to see all of our under s t a n di n g s, including our moral unders t a n d i n g s, as rooted in the strivings and limits of human ex p e r i e n c e -we see that nat u ralist claim points us to the ways we should think about k n ow i n g, about what people sometimes call c og n i t i o n, about what it means to know and to justify certain princip l e s. But the more I thought and the more I scribbled-I shouldn't say t h at because I didn't scribble; I used a computer and I did what most people do when they write: they rew r i t e. As I wrote and rew r o t e -p e rhaps I should put it that way-I came to a better understanding of t h e i m p o rtance for human ex p e r i e n c e, and for human communities, of m a king commitments, of h av i n g, if I may say so, articles of faith.
There is a difference between knowing something ab s t ra c t ly, hav i n g the psychic competence or ab i l i t y, and having the resolve to do something about it, to accept your commitment-commitment to other peop l e, commitment to the groups to which you belong, commitment to your life's work, commitment to marr i ag e, commitment to your children-commitment to all of these things-they're all lining up, and it's an endless line, but there it is. Our lives are made up of c o m m i t m e n t s, but we have to be able to make those commitments, and communities h ave to make those commitments. And so I concluded this book with a chapter which I called "Covenant and Commonwe a l t h . " I find my s e l f again going back to ideas that are rooted in religious experience and religious thought, that is, the notion of c ovenant: the notion that we enter into solemn obl i gations-in religious imag e ry, we enter into obl i gations or treaties (another word for covenant), with God or what eve r m ay be the source of our moral being-such that the outcome is that we h ave embraced certain articles of faith. These articles of faith cannot be dismissed as figments of our imag i n ation or illusions that people have, because they are what drive us and organize us and help us to arra n g e our live s.
It may not alw ays be easy to explain. For ex a m p l e, perhaps the gr e atest article of faith to which most of us here are committed might be called moral equality-not necessarily complete social equality bu t m o ral equality, as Lincoln said in 1863 at Gettysbu r g, "dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." O f c o u rse there was a bit of s l i p p age there-by "men" he meant all men and women-but "dedicat e d to the proposition" means embracing as an article of faith that eve ry human being has intrinsic worth, and therefore eve ry human being has at some point to be treated as an end and not as a means, or, as Kant said, not as a means only. Of c o u rse we do treat people as means; we treat them as human resources in business and in the military and so on and so fo rth. But the gr e at difference between a moral institution or a mora l community and one that is not one, is that, in the end, ways will be fo u n d to honor the principle of m o ral equality, to say that this person deserve s deference and respect as a human being. N ow it is not easy to explain ex a c t ly why we should embrace such an idea. We might say, as I my s e l f b e l i eve, that the best ex p l a n ation is really a negat i ve ex p l a n ation. We think: if we don't have such a proposition, i f we don't have that article of faith, then some ve ry bad things happen. We unleash all kinds of potentialities for people to have contempt fo r one another, to harm one another in important way s, and it is this negat i ve argument that seems to work best. We have other reasons, I suppose, that there ought to be moral equality because we know that all human beings, high or low, learned or not, spiritually learned or spiritually m u s ical, any one of them, eve ry single person, is an example of f rail humanity. Eve ry such person can know sin in one way or another, and eve ry such pers o n can aspire to redeem himself and can do something about that fall from gra c e, and in that sense we are all alike: in that sense we have mora l e q u a l i t y. Whether or not we would still accept that as a completely convincing ex p l a n ation of w hy we are so dedicated is not so clear. President Lincoln didn't have to answer that question as he was giving a short speech and he was finished in a couple of m i n u t e s. And anyway it wasn ' t up to him to do that .
And so we don't really have to answer that question, but we do have to recognize that we can't have effective human communities without a rticles of faith: that means, without cove n a n t s, without agreements that we make to one another and to what ever principles we think gove rn our l i ve s, without a sense that these are commitments we have made and will stand by-they are who we are and they are the sources of our being.
Let me put it this way: civility is naked without articles of faith, which tell us who we are and what we live by -n a ked and empty; civility is fo rmal, arid, unsupported by deep feelings. On the other hand, piety without civility is debased and out of control. I think you know what I mean by that and I don't need to ex p at i ate upon it. Without civility, without a principle of respect, allows our passions to run wild and especially the passions that we have that stem from our attachments and our special l oya l t i e s.
I suppose the larger message that I have, if I have a messag e, is that it is important for us to recognize that this kind of d i s t i n c t i o n -t h e r e might be many others we could ex p l o r e -b e t ween civility and piety is not just an academic exe r c i s e. Neither is it something that it is given to us to reconcile easily and without pain. It requires our most earn e s t e f fo rts and our thoughts and commitments in order to see that there is a continuing source of t r o u ble and difficulty, something that we have to look into our own hearts to deal with and to assuag e. It is a difficulty which makes our lives not trouble free but troubl e d -n ow and, I think, fo r eve r. And it is this trouble that we all have to recognize and to accep t . I f we aren't willing to do that, it means we haven't quite seen the dilemmas and ambiguities of our human live s. I thank you ve ry much for list e n i n g.
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